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Digital censorship in Venezuela started long before the elections of July 28. For decades, Venezuelan civil society has documented abuses of the right to internet access. There is also an extensive history of public policies imposed to control the telecommunications infrastructure and the flow of information online, as well as state violence perpetrated against journalists and other people who use digital and social media. Many of these actions have come alongside intimidation tactics aimed at preventing people from expressing dissent against the government.
These actions have been orchestrated gradually and increasingly over time, as the state has evolved from a democracy into an authoritarian regime. In 2010, for example, the National Assembly passed a telecommunications law granting the executive branch the power to regulate all internet content accessible in Venezuela. All internet service providers (ISPs) based in Venezuela were, and still are, obliged to block content per the instructions of the National Telecommunications Commission (CONATEL), an administrative body.
Following the 2024 presidential elections, the state has increasingly deployed its apparatus of surveillance and control. It has combined multiple restrictions to access to information, systematic harassment and surveillance, threats to social media platforms, and the blocking/shutting down of media outlets and other sites and apps, including Signal, X (previously Twitter), Reddit, Microsoft, AWS Cloudfront, and Mercado Libre. It has also threatened to block others. It is important to note that people’s ability to access a website or platform can vary depending on the ISP and VPN being used.
Intensive surveillance and intimidation
Maduro’s regime resorts to fear as a way to clamp down on the population. The current digital lynching cases against people who oppose Maduro’s regime and the fear of this continuing to happen can have a chilling effect on the population. The intensive use of monitoring and surveillance systems violates the rights of freedom of the press, of expression, and of association, restricting the actions of civil society, journalists, and the broader citizenry.
Here is a recap of some of the tools used for surveillance and control:
Interception of communications through service providers: This monitoring strategy is not new in Venezuela. In 2021, Telefónica intercepted the communications of over 20% of its clients’ phone lines or internet connections in the country. The Public Ministry prosecutors have the authority to request such interceptions. In the 2024 post-electoral context, the Chancellor’s Office published a statement rejecting the interim report of the UN Panel of Electoral Experts. The document released by the government refers to calls and video calls between members of the panel and the U.S. Department of State, which suggests the government may have interfered with the panel’s communications.
Drones: Days after the elections, many citizens reported they had seen drones in the context of increased militarization and massive protests. A local source confirmed to Access Now that the drones flying over Caracas have thermal sensors, but at night they would still turn on the lights of the devices, perhaps to make the population feel surveilled. This is even more alarming considering that in 2022, experts stated that Venezuela could be the first country in the region to have armed drones.
Carnet de la Patria (Homeland card): The Homeland card was implemented in 2018 as an element of the Sistema Patria (Homeland system), and the government promoted its use. Without it, Venezuelans cannot access social assistance and state subsidies. The population’s lack of trust in the government has led many people to desist from using the card and accessing social benefits. Furthermore, there is no data protection law or division of powers in Venezuela to support using it.
Apart from the risks of a data breach due to centralizing multiple pieces of information in one database, the card opens up the risk of government abuse, invasion of privacy, and community control, especially if the information is cross-referenced with other databases. The record of human rights violations committed by the Chinese company ZTE — developer of the card — is also relevant. In the past, the company has supported authoritarian measures imposed by other governments, including helping to limit the type of information Iranians could access online in 2013.
Snitch culture: For decades, the government has encouraged citizens to snitch on those who oppose the regime. As part of the “Operación Tun Tun” campaign, after the elections, the government has been insisting that people report “traitors to the nation” via VenApp, which is no longer available for download on the Apple App Store and Google Play Store due to the many reports against it.
Similar to the Carnet de la Patria, VenApp is a way for the state to exploit the population’s needs to promote the use of a technology that leads to the creation of databases, which in turn can enable state monitoring and control. The former is the only way people can access many social benefits, while the latter is a tool that is supposedly used to report failures and disruptions of services, a recurring issue in Venezuela.
Social networks have also been a breeding ground for non-consensual dissemination of third-party personal information (doxxing), both by the general population, and as a means of intimidation used by the authorities. There are also reports that in some neighborhoods of Caracas, the houses of people who oppose the regime got marked.
The Venezuelan government itself has admitted that there are currently over 2,000 detained people. The lack of transparency from the authorities prevents us from learning the correlation between those who have been snitched on and those who have been detained, but the urge to report dissidents through both formal and informal mechanisms is already alarming and creates a permanent state of high alert. Family and neighbors are key in the support networks of communities. If a neighbor becomes an enemy, it can destroy the social fabric, and repairing it may take a very long time.
Supporting Venezuelan civil society
The hectic world we live in, and the constant pressure on the media and communications platforms to provide updated information, make it easier for other international events to divert attention from Venezuela, minimizing coverage and attention to the ongoing crisis. It is crucial to keep this situation in the public eye via social media, news agencies, and international organizations, to continue the push for transparency regarding multiple reported abuses and irregularities.
Some ways to continue supporting Venezuelan civil society include:
- Staying informed and amplifying the content of reliable local organizations, such as VE Sin Filtro, RedesAyuda, Probox, and the local press, including Efecto Cocuyo and Caracas Chronicles. Local organizations are focused on documenting and following up on what they can. Sharing their work and amplifying it in English and other languages can help Venezuelan organizations reach international audiences and disrupt the spread of disinformation.
- Signing and forwarding our joint open letter on technology-enabled political violence in Venezuela. The letter already has approximately 200 signatures and outlines many of the civil society’s concerns. It can be signed both as an individual or on behalf of an organization.