We live in hard times for peacemakers. Governments across the board are defunding humanitarian and human rights work, even as they increase their budgets for spending on defence and military technology. Meanwhile much to-do is made over the threats posed by cyberwarfare — yet little attention, if any, is given to efforts aiming to build lasting peace in the digital sphere, by working toward a digital ceasefire.
In the context of the unfolding genocide in Gaza, for instance, Access Now has repeatedly called not only for a cessation to physical hostilities, but also for an end to attacks on communications infrastructure and digital connectivity. This digital component of warfare is now commonplace in conflicts worldwide, from Ukraine to Myanmar to Sudan; yet it remains frequently overlooked in peacemaking efforts. To address this gap, Access Now has brought together various experts involved in peace-building, negotiation, or implementation at fora including the 2024 Paris Peace Forum and RightsCon 2025, to discuss what a digital ceasefire should look like.
What’s the current status quo?
Article 36 of the 1907 Hague Convention defines a ceasefire, also known as an armistice, as a suspension of military operations by mutual agreement between the belligerent parties. Since then, hundreds of treaties and agreements have helped refine what parties to a given conflict are willing to give and take with a view to achieving peace. Unfortunately, few of these instruments were drafted with the internet, technology, or social media in mind.
So far, the language adopted by negotiating parties on ICT-related events merely includes references to propaganda, defamatory, untruthful statements by the media, or calls to respect civilian infrastructure and guarantee freedom of expression and of the media. But this only covers a fraction of the role that cyber conduct plays in armed conflicts today.
How do we define a digital ceasefire?
It would be a grave mistake to ignore the impact of cyberattacks, internet shutdowns, and disinformation campaigns in current conflicts, which is often felt long after a traditional ceasefire is reached or a conflict has ended. For example, state and non-state actors may run covert digital campaigns to spread disinformation that reignites violence or undermines trust in the very institutions trying to reinstate stability. This in turn can threaten regional and international security and expose actors supporting ongoing peace processes to additional risks.
Physical and virtual attacks on ICT infrastructure, systems, and assets can have equally long-lasting effects — but just as not all episodes of violence meet the threshold of an armed conflict and not all hostile behaviors constitute direct participation in hostilities, not all ICT-related activities should be considered as acts of war.
It’s important not to directly equate the digital ecosystem to a traditional battlefield, especially in the current turbulent and polarized geopolitical environment. They are not always the same, or even comparable. As such, arbitrarily selecting which legal framework to apply to assessments of activities involving cyberattacks, spyware, or even just the publication of digital content could open the door wider for manipulation or abuse by malicious actors willing to weaken or undermine existing human rights and humanitarian protections. It might also entrench harmful and erroneous views of the internet as being an inherently dangerous or hostile space that must be restricted or controlled by military or security authorities.
In addition, not everyone even agrees that we need shiny new legal tools to tackle this new dimension of warfare. As such, our efforts to map a pathway to a digital ceasefire aim to strengthen and reinforce, not replace, existing peacemaking frameworks, which remain relevant. In fact, we believe that developing a more precise definition of what constitutes an ICT-related breach of ceasefire will increase the likelihood of warring parties upholding existing provisions, and create more opportunities for holding perpetrators accountable.
With this in mind, together with our group of partners and experts, Access Now has drafted a tentative definition for a digital ceasefire:
A digital ceasefire is an agreement that regulates the cessation of all military and paramilitary forces’ acts of violence against ICT infrastructure or through cyber activities, in which agreeing parties may also commit to take all reasonable measures to prevent, monitor, mitigate, and address the initiation or facilitation of similar hostilities, including possibly by third parties.
What’s next for our digital ceasefire work?
Developing a tentative definition of a digital ceasefire is just one more step in the journey toward updating traditional ceasefire processes for the current age. Our discussions with experts have so far highlighted the inadequacies of existing language in the digital era, the struggle to get tech companies engaged in what is still seen as an exercise for state actors alone, and the distance we remain from any adequate accountability mechanisms.
Technology is increasingly integrated into peace mediators and negotiators’ toolkits. But to protect civilians and critical infrastructure, and ensure comprehensive, lasting peace and security, any modern ceasefire framework must address both kinetic and digital events. All future mediation, negotiation, and peace texts should include specific provisions to stop digital manifestations of hostilities.
Together with the experts who’ve joined the process, we will soon be hosting a consultation to discuss our proposed definition, before bringing the outcomes of our journey so far, and our proposed path forward, to the attention of all concerned states and international actors.
We welcome additional support and input from actors involved in peacemaking processes or interested in engaging. If this resonates with you, contact [email protected].