Read in Arabic / للقراءة بالعربية
Syria was once described as “one of the most dangerous places to use the internet in the world.” Under the rule of Bashar al-Assad, every online step carried risk: deep-packet inspection to facilitate surveillance and “analyze and control the activities of Syrian Internet users,” blocked websites to control the flow of information, and detention of activists, journalists, and even ordinary citizens for their online speech and activities.
With the regime’s fall in late 2024, Syrians see an opportunity for a free, safe, and open web: a virtual space for civil society, entrepreneurs, students, and families long torn apart by war. Yet there are significant challenges ahead. Half of Syria’s infrastructure is “destroyed or rendered dysfunctional,” including its communication networks. This destruction is compounded by decades-long stifling sanctions that not only choke Syrians and hinder humanitarian assistance, but also bar reconstruction and economic recovery, including the export of telecom and dual-use equipment.
Last week, the new U.S. administration suddenly announced its intention to lift its sanctions on Syria, and earlier this week, the EU followed suit, announcing that it would remove all economic sanctions. These welcome developments are critical first steps toward letting Syrians reclaim their digital future. Connectivity underpins humanitarian assistance, open and connected spaces, economy, governance, and people’s ability to enjoy their human, social, and economic rights. Without a functioning information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure, rebuilding Syria will lack the digital spine it needs.
However, rebuilding Syria’s internet requires not only hardware restoration and sanctions relief, but also policy overhaul. In this blog post, we outline the legacy of Syria’s digital repression and highlight some of the technical and legal challenges the transitional government must overcome to cut ties with the past, and deliver a free and open internet for all Syrians.
Syria’s digital landscape: context and challenges
At the helm of the transition sits the new president of Syria, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who faces what amounts to a digital Rubik’s Cube — with half of its pieces missing. He inherits an ICT sector both weaponized for control and battered by war. He has also been designated a terrorist, together with jihadi group that took over the government, by the UN Security Council, the U.S., and the EU — adding further restrictions (and complexity) for stakeholders seeking to engage with the new Syrian government.
One of his many tests will be breaking away from the brutal legacy of al-Assad; while the recent unblocking of websites and ending “internet rationing” are positive developments, much more needs to be done.
For years, Syria’s telecom sector has been a government-dominated realm: from the establishment of state-owned telecommunications with a government monopoly on fixed-line services, to the rigging of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) for surveillance. For instance, during periods of protest, both Syriatel and MTN Syria complied with government orders to block the SMS messages organizers were using to make plans. Authorities also implemented “content filtering” to bar people’s access to news sites and social networks, and in some cases executed full internet shutdowns — most infamously in 2013, when they deliberately cut connectivity “in order to withhold violations and massacres committed by the government forces,” as well as to disrupt the opposition and suppress dissent.
Exacerbating the situation is the fact that Syria has had a fragmented internet. For instance, communities that were in opposition-held areas, such as Idlib, came to rely on Turkish ISPs and a patchwork of local providers, while people in government-held regions remained tied to the old state-run backbone. In May 2025, the newly appointed Minister of Communications unveiled a unification strategy under the SilkLink and Ugarit 2 initiatives to rebuild the digital infrastructure, bridge these divided networks, and lay the groundwork for a modern, nationally integrated telecom system. However, these are still fledgling efforts.
After the regime’s fall, there have been occasional internet disruptions and outages, officially blamed on “sabotage” of fiber cables, raising concerns about whether internet shutdowns are resurfacing as a repression tactic of the new transitional government. Notably, Syrian authorities have persisted in imposing exam-related shutdowns on the pretext of preventing student cheating, a disproportionate practice that leaves entire populations disconnected and unable to reach essential services. It will be important to see if they change course this year.
War has also damaged a lot of the infrastructure in the country. By 2018, over one-third of Syria’s physical infrastructure had been impacted, with a UN-Habitat report confirming that “virtually all bulk infrastructure has been destroyed or damaged.” For many Syrians, this has meant years of patchy and slow internet, and for humanitarian actors, it has resulted in significant constraints and challenges in the delivery of aid and assistance.
Even in Assad-controlled zones where there was relatively stable internet connectivity, repressive laws have strangled free expression. Syria’s Cybercrime Law No. 20/2022 uses loosely defined terms such as “decency and modesty online,” “crimes against the constitution,” and “undermining the prestige of the state,” which enable authorities to impose fines and prison sentences to muzzle journalists and critics alike. Since its enactment, at least 146 arrests have been linked to the law as of August 2023, and the figures are likely higher. Without legal reform, any technical fixes and rebuilding of infrastructure and connectivity networks cannot stand on their own.
Assad is gone — now it’s time for sanctions to go too
Syrians welcomed U.S. President Trump’s decision to lift sanctions with jubilation. Syria is one of the most sanctioned countries on earth, the most extensive of which have been imposed by the U.S. for decades. In 1979, the U.S. government designated Syria as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism,” then followed up with further sanctions in the mid 2000s for Syria’s interference in Lebanon and use of chemical weapons. In response to Al-Assad’s brutal crackdown on protests back in 2011, the U.S. expanded its sanctions regime even further, placing the country under a near-complete economic embargo. In addition to freezing the assets of the Syrian government and its officials, the U.S. prohibited trade and investment in Syria by U.S. persons and banned the direct or indirect export, sale, or provision of services to Syria by U.S. persons, including U.S. companies and banks.
The Caesar Act, passed in December 2019, marked yet another significant escalation in U.S. sanctions. It broadened “secondary sanctions” by targeting non-U.S. actors who engage in transactions with Syria, including those providing “significant financial, material, or technological support” to the Syrian government, state-owned enterprises, or affiliated entities. The law also penalizes individuals and companies that profit from the conflict through participation in reconstruction efforts.
With the U.S. decision to lift its Syria sanctions, eyes turned to the EU, which has been openly mulling over the issue. The EU imposed several sanctions on Syria in 2011. They ended all bilateral cooperation with the Syrian state and restricted financial transactions, investment, and trade in specific sectors, including banning the export of technology and equipment that can be used for state repression or surveillance. They also targeted 316 Syrian individuals and 86 organizations with travel bans and froze their assets for their complicity in human rights abuses.
Now, the EU has chosen to lift economic sanctions on Syria, but maintain sanctions targeting the Assad regime and his cronies. This latest development builds on the EU’s February 2025 easing of restrictions in key economic sectors such as energy, transport, and banking.
The breadth of the U.S. and EU sanctions has often proven counterproductive — disproportionately harming civilians, and restricting their access to the internet and digital tools.
For example, in 2018, sanctions resulted in Coursera and Udemy blocking Syrian users, denying students access to education during wartime. Sanctions also disrupted people’s access to essential software and services, including antivirus updates, OS patches, and development tools. In 2019, sanctions led to GitHub restricting access for Syrian developers.
Sanctions have also excluded Syrians from the global financial system, leading them to pursue extremely dangerous avenues to transfer money, sometimes at the risk of torture and imprisonment. PayPal and Amazon have restricted services to Syrian users, cutting them off from e-commerce and digital payments.
These effects have been magnified during crises. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Syrians were unable to access Netflix and Zoom, just as the rest of the world turned to these digital platforms to remain connected in times of isolation and distress. Following the devastating 2023 earthquake, fundraising via GoFundMe was blocked due to sanctions, delaying urgently needed aid.
Over-compliance has deepened the harm. Navigating the complex web of sanctions rules can be hard and tech companies, wary of civil or criminal liability, often go beyond what regulations require. In 2009, LinkedIn acknowledged it had wrongly blocked Syrian users due to over-enforcement of export controls. Today, many Google services — including Google Play, Google Ads, among other paid services — remain inaccessible in Syria.
Given the sheer scope and impact of U.S. and EU sanctions, lifting them should be a significant turning point with the potential to transform the lives of millions of Syrians. However, it remains to be seen how each government will unravel the complex web of sanctions they have imposed, and what the impact will be on Syrians’ lives and digital future. For instance, the U.S. announcement doesn’t automatically open the door for restoring access to blocked platforms and tools in Syria. It is imperative that tech companies ensure their services are made available to Syrians as soon as the legal roadblocks are lifted.
Charting a path forward: rebuilding a free and open digital Syria
Reclaiming Syria’s digital future hinges on three fronts: physical reconstruction, legal reform, and sanctions relief. Following the devastation and destruction of the Assad regime, rebuilding hospitals, schools, and roads is urgent. So too is restoring Syria’s digital backbone: fiber cables, cell towers, and data centers. Modern life runs on the internet, and after years of conflict, networks lie in ruins and service providers struggle to keep up. A resilient, modern internet is not a luxury but the foundation for recovery and for shaping Syria’s next chapter. Ensuring free, open, and secure internet will unlock new opportunities and enable Syrians to rebuild their country and the economy.
The international community, especially the U.S. and the EU, must therefore urgently implement lifting their sanctions that restrict the import of critical hardware and software and block access to financial and digital services necessary for economic recovery and reconstruction.
At the same time, the Syrian government must decisively cut ties with Assad’s brutal past and work toward upholding and protecting human rights, online and off. Syrian lawmakers and regulators should repeal repressive laws, such as the cybercrime law, that restrict online activity and speech. They should also center civil society — including experts who have long advocated for human rights and accountability in Syria — in the reform and reconstruction effort.
It’s time to leave arbitrary detentions, internet shutdowns, censorship, surveillance, and other draconian practices in the past, and enable Syrians to build a digital future that is open, safe, and free.