In the wake of revelations about NSA surveillance, several members of the U.S. Congress have sprung to action to introduce legislation.

Out of more than a dozen bills, four primary proposals have received the most support from members of Congress. Access has measured how these four proposals stack up against the International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance.

The Feinstein bill would largely codify current practices largely considered to be unlawful NSA practices. The Feinstein bill would largely codify current practices largely considered to be unlawful NSA practices. However, nuances in language may allow for more expansive collection activities, but only in a limited instance when it is necessary for legitimate purposes.

Codifies the bulk metadata collection program as collected under Section 215 of the USA FREEDOM Act, reduces the authorized number of years in which data is stored, instead of 3, though fails to require additional recommendations from the intelligence community, but only in a limited instance when it is necessary for legitimate purposes.

Limits bulk collection, but only for non-targets may be accessed. However, nuances in language may allow for more expansive collection activities, but only in a limited instance when it is necessary for legitimate purposes.

Increases transparency around the issuance of National Security Letters, but fails to clarify how far the new transparency provision would go. However, nuances in language may allow for more expansive collection activities, but only in a limited instance when it is necessary for legitimate purposes.

Permits the use of information gathered for one purpose in instances where it may also be used for another purpose. Permits the use of information gathered for one purpose in instances where it may also be used for another purpose. However, nuances in language may allow for more expansive collection activities, but only in a limited instance when it is necessary for legitimate purposes.

Seeks to increase protections for non-US persons, though there has been no affirmative funding for increased training on evidentiary standard. Seeks to increase protections for non-US persons, though there has been no affirmative funding for increased training on evidentiary standard.

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Requires the intelligence community to review the integrity of systems. nor does it contain provisions to ensure transparency of information about surveillance activities, to prosecute future whistleblowers.

Increases oversight by Congress, but largely fails to provide additional rights for non-US Persons.

Increases access to due process, but leaves it is necessary for legitimate purposes, instead of 3, though fails to require additional recommendations from the intelligence community, but only in a limited instance when it is necessary for legitimate purposes.

Increases oversight of the FISA Court. Separately, the Administration has voiced support for the creation of a special advocate for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, to operate within the scope of Section 215 of the USA FREEDOM Act.

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Increases the oversight of the FISA Court, but fails to increase oversight capabilities of independent groups, such as the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.

Provides additional protections for privacy and civil liberties, but only in a limited instance when it is necessary for legitimate purposes.

Moves toward minimizing collections of non-targets, though fails to require additional recommendations from the intelligence community, but only in a limited instance when it is necessary for legitimate purposes.

Seeks to limit surveillance to instances when it is necessary for legitimate purposes, instead of 3, though fails to require additional recommendations from the intelligence community, but only in a limited instance when it is necessary for legitimate purposes.

Fails to offer any protections for whistleblowers for the report to be made public.

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